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Adam Smith, writing in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, attempted to explain the growth in labour
productivity which was occurring round him largely in
terms of human dexterity and organisational changes
which, for him, were the significant factors underlying
the division of labour. It was Marx, however, writing
one hundred years later, who grasped the significance
of machines. These machines, he argued, were not
merely characterised by the form of power used, but
also by the mechanisation of the tools which were
being used, and in some cases, the automation of the
control of these tools.
The development of this machine-power, continually
subject to technical change, underlies the quite
unprecedented growth of the world economy over the
past two centuries. Over this period not only have the
control of tool-devices and the quality of materials
used grown in sophistication, but there has been a
continual improvement in the physical power used to
drive machines. The power source has moved from
humans to animals, to water, to steam (wood and coal
based) to the internal combustion engine, the electric
motor and, possibly in the future, even to the atom.
But, some observers argue, in the same way as this
growth in the control of energy underlay the 'first'
industrial revolution of the past centuries, so the
'second' industrial revolution in the future will depend
upon the control of information. And the key to this
ability to manipulate and transmit information lies in
the rapidly emerging technology of microelectronics.
This issue of the Bulletin, whilst less ambitious in
scope than the grandiose recasting of industrial history
described above, attempts to explore some of the
possible impacts which microelectronics technology
might have on the problems of underdevelopment. Its
particular focus is an examination of its impact on
international trade. A simple-minded explanation of
its significance might be as follows: the existing
international division of labour depends upon developed
countries supplying technology and developing
economies providing labour; but when there is no
longer a need for labour, where lies the future
comparative advantage of developing countries? But
before we move on to a brief discussion of some of the
issues involved in this subject area, it is appropriate to
begin with a description of the technology.
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Microelectronics technology:
a brief description
To understand the significance of the new technology
it is essential to comprehend the explanatory power of
binary logic. Basically this enables one to count or
manipulate ideas in an either/or (ie binary) framework.
For example, consider counting: if we specify three
switches, the first representing the number '1', the
second '2' and the third '4', then we can count up to '7'
by switching on all of the switches and to '6' by only
taking into account the values of the second and third
switches. In this way, by making a suitable number of
switches available, we are able to count as high a
number as we like via a series of either/or decisions.
Similarly, logical systems can also be broken down
into a series of binary decision-points.
What microelectronics does is to provide the capability
to operate these binary systems cheaply within very
confined spaces and without any moving parts. The
key to this capability was the invention of the solid-
state (ie no moving parts) transistor in 1947 which
provided the basic either/or building block. In 1959
the integrated circuit, which allowed for the
incorporation of more than one binary gate on each
'chip' (as these tiny pieces of silicon have come to be
called) was developed and in 1971 a new programmable
capability was provided by the invention of the
microprocessor (often called 'the computer on a chip').
Progress over the years has been startling and sustained.
For example, since 1959 the number of binary gates on
each chip has doubled every year with an annual
average reduction in costs of 30 per cent. At the same
time reliability has increased and power consumption
has declined.
As these chips have cheapened so has the range of
uses. Beginning in the US in the military and space
sector, the technology was initially associated with the
introduction of new products such as computers and
television. It was consequently a technology associated
with expansion of production, trade and employment.
However from the mid 1970s microelectronics came
to be used as a substitute for mechanical control
devices (eg watches, machine controls) and counting
systems (eg cash registers). In this most recent era it
has begun to penetrate into a vast number of existing
products (from cars to children's toys) and processes
(from driverless tractors to monitors of animal health)
and serves the function of making these processes and
products more efficient. So from an optimistic image
of 'engine to growth', microelectronics has begun to
make the transition to 'destroyer of jobs' (even though
its labour-saving characteristics are only one feature
of the advantages it offers to users).
Microelectronics technology cannot possibly offer
something for nothing. Thus while the 'hardware'
(that is the chips themselves) might be effectively
costless the ability to get them to operate usefully
through the medium of software (written instructions)
is costly in terms of human intellectual effort, and
requires skills which are currently in short supply. But
the compensating benefits which the technology offers
are impressive. Without suggesting that all uses provide
the same benefits, or the same degree, or benefits in
the same relative order of importance, it is possible to
distinguish three different sets of benefits which can
be, and have been, realised. These are:
in product. This includes new products (eg
televisions), products with improved performance
(eg watches), better quality products and products
produced with a considerably shortened lead time;
in materials utilisation. Through optimisation
procedures, this includes the very important category
of energy-saving devices. It also includes a wide
range of uses in which shapes are cut out of a sheet
which is a characteristic of nearly all assembly
industries;
in process. Here microelectronics related process
innovations can be both capital or labour saving or
both. Moreover they can also conserve on particular
types of each of these factors (such as skilled labour,
or space). Finally it offers [as we can see from
Jacobsson's article [the very important capability of
enhanced flexibility.
The links between microelectronics and
comparative advantage
Of course, by itself, little can be held against the chip.
It provides the potential to relieve humans from dull,
repetitive jobs as well as to assist in the execution of
intellectually challenging tasks. As such it offers the
advantage of producing more and better products
with less material and human input. Rather it is the
form of social organisation within which it will be
introduced that determines the nature and extent of
benefits which will e reaped. Each of the various
contributions in this Bulletin explores the likely impact
of this technology with specific relevance to this social
context, rather than in relation to an alternative, more
'appropriate' nexus of innovation. So, if the overall
conclusion is that the introduction of the new
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technology (as it has come to be called) will have
negative impacts, then it is essential to keep in mind
the social context within which it is introduced.
Before we proceed to list some of the major issues
involved in this subject area we ought briefly to
remind ourselves of some of the developments which
have taken place in the world economy over the past
two decades. From an established division of labour
whereby the developing countries seemed consigned
to be processors of raw materials and suppliers of
agricultural commodities, we have seen the entry in
recent years of some newly industrialising countries
(NICs) as major suppliers of manufactured goods and
even of technology. South Korea's exports of
manufactures, for example, grew at an annual rate of
36 per cent between 1965 and 1975; aggregate
developing country manufactured exports grew from
$4.6 bn in 1965 to $55 bn in 1975; and the share of
developing countries in global manufacturing value
added grew from around 7 per cent in 1965 to nearly
10 per cent in 1979. Not surprisingly, on the basis of
this performance, the 1978 UNIDO Lima Conference
set a target for the developing countries of 25 per cent
of global value added in manufacturing by the year
2,000.
But both the achievements and projections occurred
within the context of an expanding world economy in
which there appeared to be space for a large number
of producers and in which (particularly given near full
employment in the developed countries) the benefits
resulting from specialisation and comparative advantage
appeared to be beneficial to most (powerful) trading
countries. But now, as we enter the 1980s, the rising
levels of unemployment in most industrial economies,
associated with fierce competition in most sectors,
suggests a different scenario. Moreover the potential
productivity benefits offered by microelectronics-
particularly in relation to the saving of labourleads
one to wonder whether comparative advantage can
still be drawn on the same lines.
In exploring the specific links between the new
technology and the changing pattern of comparative
advantage, it is possible to establish four broadly
different lines of argument. Whilst each of these can
be justified on a macro- or sectoral-plane, it is an
unfortunate fact that few sectoral studies have yet
been undertaken to assess the detailed interrelationship
between the new technology and trade. Thus the
various contributions to this Bulletin [see also Ernst
forthcoming] represent the first wave of studies which
are being undertaken in this subject area. The results
which are emerging are as yet largely suggestive and
only time will tell whether they offer a realistic portrayal
of the future. In discussing the four alternative scenarios,
we will try to merge these two sets of micro- and
macrostudies.
a) Microelectronics will have a positive impact
on developing countries comparative advantage
Here it is argued that there is no reason to believe that
the new technology will diffuse more unevenly through
the world economy than have previous technologies.
On the contrary, by saving on specialised skills Isee
Jacobsson in this Bulletin] it is particularly suited to
developing economies and consequently it will have a
disproportionately positive impact on Third World
comparative advantage. Moreover since the new
technology is inherently a systems technology f see
Rada and Kaplinsky in this issue] it may well be that it
is easier to introduce in expanding developing
economies in which there are fewer impediments to
change, than in rationalising industrialised economies
which have a long history of established work
patterns.
h) Microelectronics will have little impact on
comparative advantage
In this scenario microelectronics is essentially seen as
one in a long series of incremental technologies. It has
no major impact on economic activity (and therefore
leaves the macro-world unchanged) and it diffuses
through the world economy at the same rate as other
types of technology. None of the contributions to this
Bulletin would appear to support this view, but that
may only represent the obvious fact that no-one who is
unconcerned about the problem would bother to do
research on the subject!
c) The diffusion of microelectronics
technologies will he associated with a reduction
in developing country advantage
There is a wide variety of different 'schools' in this
scenario. One of them is represented by a form of
'long wave' theory. This builds upon the recognition of
50 year long wave cycles in the world economy which
are associated with the introduction of major 'heartland'
technologies. Each of these cycles is considered to
have an expansionary upswing in which the new
heartland technology is predominantly used for the
introduction of new products, and a rationalising
downswing in which the technology is used to enhance
competitiveness in the context of growing compe-
tition.
Within this framework, the period 1950-75 saw the
expansionary upswing of the microelectronics based
cycle with full employment and a growing international
division of labour. Now that the world economy is in
the rationalising downswing with growing unemploy-
ment at the centre (partly fuelled by labour-saving
microelectronics technologies), the 'space' no longer
exists for peripheral economies. Trade barriers and
increased competitiveness of developed country
producers using the new technology thus undermine
the developing country comparative advantage which
began to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s.
At a less grandiose level, a number of sectoral studies
seem to confirm this trend towards comparative
advantage reversal. The contributions by Rada, Braun,
Hoffman and Rush, and Kaplinsky in this Bulletin
would seem to confirm the hypothesis that the use of
the new technology provides significant benefits to
innovating firms and serves to undermine the potential
comparative advantage of developing countries using
cheap labour and pre-microelectronic technologies.
In some cases (semiconductors and garments, for
example) it is already possible to identify examples of
trade reversal. Only Jacobsson's article suggests that
the introduction of the new technology will be
associated with enhanced developing country
comparative advantage. And even in this case, it is
argued that it is likely to be only a temporary
phenomenon.
Finally, a third set of arguments sees the introduction
of microelectronics technology as associated with
growing centralising tendencies in the world economy
(see Rada's contribution 1, In the context of the growing
crisis in the world economy, and with the undermining
of developing country comparative advantage by the
use of the next technology, these transnational
companies will be less likely to locate production in
the periphery. This is precisely what appears to be
occurring now within the electronics industry itself
(see Clarke and Cable, and Rada].
d) The impact will vary between countries
Most observers (Clarke and Cable, Rada, Hoffman
and Rush and Jacobsson) recognise that developing
countries are not a homogeneous group. Some of the
NICs have by now established a level of industrial
sophistication which probably means that they will
already have made the transition to 'industrial
development'. This group of countries, they argue,
will almost certainly be less badly affected than the
non-NIC developing countries.
Some policy implications
The contributions to this Bulletin reflect the embryonic
stage of research in this area. Consequently it is
difficult to offer more than tentative policy conclusions
(although each of the relevant authors do so in their
more extensive research reports). However three
conclusions stand out in importance.
a) The use of microelectronics technology
Braun cautions against the conclusion that developing
countries should move into the production of
electronics components. However it is overwhelmingly
clear that the new technology represents a quantum
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leap in efficiency and unless developing countries
adopt it in products and processes, they will be forced
to retreat from world markets (particularly with respect
to exports to industrialised economies) and to increase
protection to domestic producers. The signs are that
the new technology is relatively easy to use and
requires fewer and less skilled operators and less of
some types of maintenance and repair skills (Jacobsson
and Kaplinsky). But the danger is that even if developing
countries do introduce the new technology, trade
barriers partly resulting from job displacement in
developed countries may well close off trade
opportunities anyhow.
b) The development of software skills
The 'old' view that underdevelopment is caused by an
absence of skills has by now been exploded in the
context of high levels of unemployed graduates in
many developing countries. The irony is that many of
these countries (particularly India) are exceptionally
rich in the very 'software' skills which constrain the
introduction of microelectronics in developed countries.
It is an open question, therefore, whether this software
capability could be a source of developing country
comparative advantage in the future, or whether the
absence of an 'organic' link between this skilled cadre
and indigenous industry undermines the feasibility of
this policy option. The contribution by Bogod suggests
a role for developed country technical assistance in
this area in further encouraging the production of
software skills in developing countries.
e) Appropriate technology
Hitherto the introduction of microelectronics has been
associated with the military sector and in meeting the
needs of developed country producers and consumers.
Little attention has yet been given to meeting the
requirements of groups within developing countries,
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to take advantage of the significant benefits which the
technology offers. By this we do not mean the
development of the solar-powered video recorders
suggested by one agency to meet the basic needs of
Indian villages, but rather technologies such as
irrigation-control systems (eg in drip-feeds), meteorolo-
gical forecasting for islands characterised by micro-
climates and rural health care systems. The
development of appropriate systems to meet developing
country needs deserves far greater emphasis than it
currently gets.
In conclusion, therefore, despite the 'under-
development' of our awareness of the specific impact
of microelectronics related innovations we cannot fail
to recognise their significance. For a whole series of
reasons, the coming decades are clearly going to differ
from the previous ones and it is important to bear in
mind the technological dimensions of the changing
world if appropriate policy responses are to be
fashioned. At the same time it would clearly be foolish
to ignore the political-economic context in which
these technological developments are occurring.
Technology cannot be seen as an 'abstract good' since
it takes particular forms which reflect the interests of
the innovating parties. And in addition since
transnational firms account for such a large share of
world trade in manufactures, any set of policy responses
should be acutely timed to the likely reaction of TNCs
to these changing technological, political, economic
and social climates.
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